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ARISTOTLE ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
Fred D» Miller, Jr.
Bowline) Green State University
SAGP March 1986
1.

Introduction

Aristotle discusses property in many different contents
throughout the Politics as well as in other works, most notably
the Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics. In this paper I. argue that
these disconnected discussions provide the materials to construct
a theory of property rights.
I am self-consciously following the
lead of Barker who refers to "the vindication of the right of
private property which appears in the second book of the
Pol itics11 (1906, p. 248).
In this as in many other instances
Barker was in turn following the lead of Newman (e.g., 1887, I,
pp. 167-168). This interprêtation must, however, be defended
anew, because many recent.commentators have categorically
asserted that there is no place in Aristotle's thought for
rights: these include Alasdair MacIntyre, Μ. X. Finley, Leo
Strauss, John Finnis, and T. H. Irwin.
In "Are There Any Rights
in Aristotle?" (read to the SAGP in October, 1934) I argued on
general grounds that concepts comparable? to modern concepts of
rights can be attributed to Aristotle because he makes normative
claims which closely approximate Hohfeldian rights claims, and I
have further contended that the theoretical objections against
interpreting Aristotle in terms of rights rely upon tendent1aus!y
narrow construíais of rights.
I shall not attempt to rehearse
those arguments here but want instead to take up the case for
rights to property specifically.
I shall begin by indicating in quite general terms how I am
using the expression "property rights" in this paper. Property
rights are legal or moral relationships involving individuals and
objects, consisting of aggregates or clusters of different sorts
of rights or their correlatives (cp„ Becker 1977, p.'21). For
example, the right to an object such as a jar of olives typically
involves both a liberty to possess it and to put. it to various
uses as well as a claim right imposing duties of noninterference
on the part of others with its possession or use. This typically
implies the right to compensation or restitution if there is
interference or harm to the object by others.
It also typically
involves the power to offer the object for sale or to give it
away, which changes the legal or moral relationships of others.
And it typically involves an immunity against others putting the
object up for sale or giving it away without the owner's consent.
My repeated use of "typically" is deliberate. The various
elements into which the relations of ownership and property have
been analyzed are not all necessarily present in all cases. Thus,
although A. M» Honore (1961) distinguishes eleven such elements
the right to possess, to use, to manage, the right to the
income, to the capital, to security, to transmissibi1 ity, the
absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, the liability to
execution, and the residual character of property ·-— he contends
that while all of these elements are required for full ownership,
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none is a necessary condition -for "owning" something«
In
asc r ib in g a c on c ep t of p r op er”t y .rig h t s t o Ar ist ot le I am claiming
t h at elements play a n iîîip o r t an t r*ole in h is η o r mat ive assertions
ab out p r op er t y an d weal t h in t h e Po 1it ics an d ot h er* wor ks «
In
t h e f o 11o w in g se c t iο η I sh a 11 s lag g e s t a w o r k in g c ο n c e p t o f
p r o p e r t y r ig h t s in A r i«!>t o 1 1e 's o w n te r m s «
A t h e o r y o -f p r o p e r i y r ig h t s s h c:)u.1d p r ovide a n sw e r s to a
number o-f questions about property rightss
(1) What individuals
can properly hold rights to property?
(2) To what objects can
t h e y have p r o p e r t y r ig h 1 1::
-?
<3 ) W h a t -fo r m is t a ke n b y exe r c is e o f
property rights?
(4) What is the general moral justification for
t h e the s is t h a t in d iv id laa 1s s h o u 1d have p r o p e r t y r ig h t s ?
<5 )
U n d e r what c ir c lam s t a n c e s d o in d iv :i
.d u a 1 s ju s 1 1y a c:qlair e title, to
.s p e c i f:l.«::: oh je c t s a n d u n d e r w h a t c::i.r c u m s t a n c.e s d o t h e y c o m e t o
possess them unjustly? (6) Under what circumstances, if any v may
p r o p e r t y r i g h t s toe a I ie n a b Ie ,, d e t e a s ib le,' o r qlaa I :l-fia b le?
<7 )
w ha t s p e e i f i c s o c i a 1 p o 1 ie ie s a r e im p 1 ie d b y p r o p e r t y r i g h t s s
i «e « i n what way s h o u 1d p r a p e r t y r i g h t s b e p r ote c t e d a n d w h a t
c on st raintB., if any, do individual property rights place lapon the
«:::ο n <::lu c t o f g o v e r n m e n t ? In a <;;>c r ib :l.n g to A r is t o tie a t h e o r y of
ρ r o p e r t y r i.g h t s I s h o la 1d b e la n d e r s t o o d a s a m biti'ously. c:1 ai mi n g
t h a t A r i s t o 1 1e o f f e r s a n s·w e r s t o qu e s t io n s s la c h a s t Inese«
T h e t e s t o f t h is in t e rp r e t a t iο n is whet h e r it does indeed
ρ r o vide a way o f c inn n e c t in g A r is t o 1 1e 's s c a 11 e r e d c Ia im s a b o u t
property into a more comprehensible whole and of critically
e k a inin :Ln g t h e m e r it s o f t Ine s e c Ia im s w it h in A r is t o tie's b r o a d e r
I“)Ini 1o s o p h ic::a 1 fr a m e w o r k .< I s h a 11 r e t u r n t o t h is in the f in a I
section«

2.

A Working Concept of Property Rights

The ancient Greeks recognize a distinction which is
fundameinta I to the coincept iοn of property r ight s the d ist inct iοn
between the mere possession of an object and the legal ownership
of it « PI ato recogn izes tinis jur id ical d ist inet ion when he makes
Socrates say that the goal of the -rulers in conducting law suits
wi 11 be "that indivi dual s shoul d nei ther have (echosi ) another 's
tinlings (tallotr ia ) nor be depr ived of thei r own th ings (ton
hau ton )15 (Republ 1c IV, 433e6-8 )» Si m i1ar 1y t he orat.or Hegésippos
states that "it is possible to have (echein) another's things and
not all those who have, have their own things* but many have
acquired (kektentai) another's things" (CDem. II 7.26) Again,
Theophrastus asserts that even if goods for sale have changed
hands, the seller remains the? owner of the property (kurion tou
ktematos > until he receives the payment. (Stobaeus, FI or i1eg.
44.22? cf. Harrison I960, I, p. 204)
Th er e wer e e1ab or at e 1eg a1 proc edur es throug ht whic h prop er ty
owners could seek protection and compensation? this is especially
evident in the Athenian legal system, about which the most is
known (cf., Harrison 1968? MacDowel1 1978)., Nevertheless, the
Greeks do not have an abstract term which unambiguously stands
for legal ownership as such (cf„ Finley 1951, pp» 53 ff«.? Jones
1956, p« 201 η» 4g Harrison 1968, I, ρ. 201? MacDowe11 1978, p.
133). Ousia, for example, is used for the concrete property
which an individual owns (cf. Plato Republ1c VIII, 551b3?
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Antiphon Tetr. A(b)12) rather than to designate ownership as
such,. The verbs echein, kratein .and kekteshai do not have special
legal or moral implications. This underscores, I think, the
importance .of Aristotle's attempt in Rhetoric I. 5, 1361al2-24 to
offer a general treatment of. the notion of wealth. (I shall
discuss the argument of which this passage is a part in the
following section.) This may be the earliest such attempt by a
Greek thinker, and it 'is of special interest here? because it
mentions central elements of the concept of property rights.
The discussion begins with an enumeration of the parts (sere)
of wealths plenty of moneys possession (ktesis) of land and
estates? possession of movable objects, animals, and slaves.
Since the Greeks included with land ownership the buildings and
.crops on it Ccf,, Harrison 1968, I, p. 202), Aristotle has
enumerated the main types of property recognised by Greek, law
(cf. MacDowell 1978, p. 133),, In this passage Aristotle states a
number of conditions which must, be met if one is to fully qualify
as being wealthy (ploutein):
Cl) the properties are-? numerous, large, and beautiful;;
(2 ) the properties are liberal (.eleutheria) or useful
(chresima)$
(3) the properties are secure (asphale) ?
<4) the properties are one's own (oikeia) 5
C5) one is actually using the property rather than
merely owning it.
I understand (2) as disjunctive because Aristotle defines the two
conditions so that they are mutually exclusive3 useful
properties are productive, those from which we derive income or
rents? whereas liberal properties are those from which we derive
pleasure but no further advantage,,
(This distinction resurfaces
in Pol itics I, 4? see section 4.) The conditions especially
important for my purposes are (3) and (4). Aristotle explains
what he means by each at 1361al9—23s "A criterion of 'security'
is possession (kekteshai) in a given place and in such a manner
that the use of the objects is up to oneself iaph’ hauto );; and a
criterion of ''being one's own <oikeia) or not1 ' is when the
alienation of it is up to oneself Ceph’ hauto)% I mean by
'alienation'(apallotriosin) giving and selling." So defined, (3)
and (4) differ importantly from Cl) which distinguishes wealth
from more modest levels of property possession? and from C5)
which distinguishes leading an actually wealthy life from being
materially capable of doing so.
(3) and (4), in contrast, are
preconditions not only of wealth but of ownership in general.
Harrison finds it "noteworthy that Aristotle should single
.out the power to alienate as the true sign of a thing being one's
own (okeion) .," C1968, I, p. 202? (compare Jones 1956, p. 198 on
the place of this power in ownership for Greek law generally).
It is also important for my argument that (3) and C4) correspond
to central elements in the modern Anglo-American concept of
property rights. To wit Becker (1977, p. 2 0 ) argues that among
Honore's elements the right to the capital is "the most
fundamental of the elements, if only because it includes the
right to destroy, consume, and alienate. (Alienation is
understood to exchanges, gifts, and just 'letting go.')" In the
light of this parallel, I take (3) and (4) to constitute an
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Aristotelian working concept of property rights, namely:
X' has a property right, in P iff» X' possesses P in such a
way that the use of P is up to X', and the alienation of
P (giving P away or selling P) is up to X'«
It is reasonable to suppose that this analysis has a force
comparable to following Hohfeldian assertions: X' is at. liberty to
use P in one way or in another way, in the sense that X is under
no obligation to use P in a particular way» And X has a claim
against others not to be interfered with in his use of P. (Cp.
1360bl6—17s the defining conditions of happiness include "the
power to protect and put to use" one's possessions»> X has the
power to transfer ownership of P to Y by giving it. or selling it
to him. And X has the liberty to do so, in the sense that X' is
.under no obligation to refrain from alienating P« (Cp. Grimaldi
who remarks that apallotriosai "Aristotle defines immediately as
the right, to give or to sell (what, one possesses) 5 1980, p» 112»)
In the remainder of this paper I shall argue that good sense
can be made of Aristotle's discussions of property in the
Pol 11 ics if he is understood as using the working concept, of
property rights just described»
3.

The Eudaimonistic Justification

One important form of justification of property concerns its
relationship to eudaimon ia or happiness»22 In the context of such
a justification occurs the analysis of wealth discussed in the
preceding section. Rhetoric I, 5 commences with an assertion of
teleology similar to the openings of the Pol iti cs and Ni cornachean
Ethics. Everybody, individually and collectively, has a goal,
and this is happiness and its parts» We should understand what
happiness is and what, its parts are, because all those who try to
persuade others presuppose what I shall call the
eudaminonistic principies
One ought to do the things which provide happiness or
any of its parts, or increase rather than decrease it,
and ought, not to do those things which destroy or hinder
it or make those things that, are contrary to it
E1360b11-141 „
This is clearly a consequentialist principle, which prescribes an
end for public policy (1360b4) as weil 1 as for self-interested
individual decision making (cp. 1360b4, 1360b31—1361al2.
Aristotle then offers an account of happiness:
Let. then happiness be (A) doing well with excellence [virtue],
or (B) self-sufficiency of life, or (C) the most
pleasant, life with security, or (D> a thriving state of
possessions and bodies with the power to protect and put
them into action C1360b14-173. 3
Aristotle; is in effect treating happiness as a "cluster concept,"
which includes both common beliefs about eudaimortia and
philosophical theories»
It is not clear whether these are meant,
to be necessary or sufficient conditions of happiness.
■Nevertheless, on the basis of this account., Aristotle infers that
happiness has numerous parts'*, including external goods, one of
which is wealth <1360b20, 28)J
The eudaimonistic justification is a straightforward
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application of the eudaimonistic principle to wealths
I« One should do the things which provide happiness or
any of its parts, or increase rather than decrease
it, and should not do those things which destroy or
hinder it or make those things that are contrary to

it.
2.

Wealth is a part, of happiness,.
3« therefore, one should do the things which provide
wealth or increase rather than decrease it and
should not do those things which destroy or impede
its use.
Premiss (2) is based on two of the disjunctive conditions of
happiness!
<B> self-sufficiency of life and (D) a. thriving state
of possessions and bodies with the power to protect and put. them
into action. Moreover, as I noted in the previous section,
Aristotle states that wealth must satisfy the conditions of being
secure and being one's own, conditions which aire central elements
of property rights! the use and alienation of the possessions
are up to the owner.
Admittedly care must be used with an argument from the first
book of the Rhetoric which is generally regarded■as early in
composition (cf. Duering 1966, p. 118). Both premisses of the
above argument, seem to be open to objection. <1 > speaks of
"parts" of happiness. Aristotle also speaks in this way in the
Eudemian Ethics I, 2, 1214b26-27; 5, 1216a39-40; and II, 1,
1219bΠ -13 and in the Maana Moral ia II, Θ, 1184a18-19, 26-29,
30—31, but he does not use this sort of language in the
N icoftiachean Et h ics (cp. Cooper 1975, p. 122) „ Even more
controversially, (2) calls wealth a part of happiness. Not only
do the ethical works not treat wealth a.s a part of happiness, but
they point out a serious mistake which (2 ) might, be taken to
commit, namely, of confusing a necessary condition of happiness
with a part of happiness (Eudemi an Ethics I, 2, 1214b24—27;
Politics VII. 1, 1323b24—29; 13, 1332a25-27>„
Nevertheless, I think
that the recent work of Cooper (1985) suggests
that the argument of the Rhetoric is, on the whole, consistent
with Aristotle's mature conception of happiness, at least in so
far as it is expresse d in the first boo k of N icomac hean Ethics ■■
This work does not merely claim, with the Magna Moralia that the
happy person needs external goods (II, 8 , 1206b33—34; cp.
Pol11ics VII, 13, 1331b41-1332al), but, as Cooper argues, it
offers a definition of happiness which includes the external
goods (ta ekta agatha) ! "thaxt person is eudaimon (flourishes, is
happy) who is active in accordance with the external goods not
for just any old period of time but for a complete life" (1985,
p. 174 translating I, 10, 1101al4—16; cp. 8 , 1099a31 ff.)» And
these "external goods" include wealth and the other items listed
in Rhetoric I, 5 (Cooper 1985, p. 177). The claim that external
goods are a constituent of "the best life" is similarly made in
Politics VIIT 1, 1323b40—1324a1. Aristotle qualifies these claims
when he treats the value of. external goods as derived from that
of virtuous activities, as Ni cornacheart Ethics VII, 13, 1153bl7—19
makes clear!
"... no activity is perfect when it is impeded, and
happiness is a perfect thing; this is why the happy man needs the
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goods of the body and external goods, i.e. those of fortune, viz.
in order that he may not be impeded in these ways."
Nevertheless, virtuous activity essentially requires the external
goods; for example, an act of generosity essentially requires the
possession of wealth. Hence, on Cooper's interpretation,
Aristotle is entitled to treated them as parts of eudaimonia
because they "are circumst.anc.es and conditions reference to which
is actually part of the essential characterization of the
virtuous activities that constitute eudaimonia, on Aristotle's
theory.” (1985, p„ 192 n. 11 )
However, the Rhetoric justification needs to be qualified to
the extent that wealth is a "part" of happiness only in the sense
of being an essential condition of its attainment. And the
justification would be restricted to property which plays an
essential role in the activities of happiness, e.g. property used
in acts of generosity.
It would not apply to property'used to
maintain life, e.g. one's food, bed, or clothing, or to property
used to produced other goods.
4.

The Instrumental ist Justification of Property

Ealitics I, 4-1 0 offers an alternative to the eudeaimonistic
justification of property rights and places ownership and
acquisition in a teleological context. Aristotle's treatment of
property is, of course, bound up with the defense of slavery, but
it includes arguments concerning property in general, and I shall
attempt to abstract these from the reasoning exclusively
concerned with slavery.
The argument of Politics I, 4 presupposes the eudaimonistic
principle and also relies upon the claim (already set forth in I,
2 ) that the household is the social institution necessary for
maintaining life and is therefore a prerequisite for the good
life or happiness.
I offer the following reconstruction of
1253b23—33, 1254a9-13s
1. One cannot live or live well without the necessary
things.
2 . CThe function of household management is maintaining
life.3 (Tacit premiss)
3. Just as in specialized arts, the proper instruments
(ta oikeia organa) must be present to fulfill their
function (ergon), the household manager must have
the proper instruments to fulfill his function.
4« CProperty cons ists in instruments used in a
household or state.3 (cp. 8, 1254al6)
5. Therefore, a possession (Artena) is an instrument for
life, separable from the possessor, and property
(ktesis) is a number of such instruments.
6 . A possession
is spoken of as a part is spoken of;
for the part is not only a part of something else,
taut wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a
possession.
7. Therefore, property is a part of the household.
This argument raises a number of problems.
It is unclear
about, whom the property belongs tos It seems to shift from
saying that an individual qua household manager must possess
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property (clearly implied by 4 and 5) to saying that, property is
a part of the household«
(This .unclarity is also found in the
case of slaverys is the slave a part of the household or of the
master? cf« I, 6 , 1255bl 1-12'J )
Also the conclusion (7) seems
to be rejected on second thought in later chapters (I, 10$ VII,
8 $ cf« Newman 1887, II, p« 135)» Further, when Aristotle defines
possessions arid property as practical instrument, he
counterintuitively rules out productive instruments as
possessions. But here it. seems he is using "possession" in a
narrow, technical sense, and his purpose in so doing is to
underscore that the present justification is applicable only to
practical property«
The instrumentalist justification differs from the
.eudaimonistic. in that it only requires property to be a necessary
condition, not a part, of the end. Moreover, the end in the case
of the instrumentalist justification is more broadly conceived as
well as the good life« Consequently, it can accommodate a wider
range of property than the eudaimonistic justification (as
narrowly construed at the end of section 3), including
possessions necessary for everyday subsistence (although as noted
above productive property is still left out of account). But in
both cases» Aristotle has argued that ought to possess certain
types of property because they are necessary for well-being.
5.

Justice and Injustice in Acquisition

A central question which a theory of property rights must
answer iss how can people originally acquire property justly?
Aristotle addresses a question which is closely related to this
when he examines the art of acquisition (chrematistike) in
Politics I, 8-11. The question takes the -forms which of the?
forms of the art of acquisition are according to nature or
contrary to nature? This is for Aristotle also a question of
what forms are just or unjust, because he relates nature and
justice by means of two fundamental principles!!' a positive
principle according to which everything in a social context which
is according to nature is just (Politics I, 5, 1255a1-3; III, 17,
1287b37—39; VII, 9, 1329al3— 17), and a negative principle
according to which everything in a social context which is
contrary to nature is unjust (I, 3, 1253b20—23; 10, 1258a40—b2;
VII, 3, 1325b7—10$ both principles are stated together at 1,5,
1254al7—20; III, 16, 1287a8-18)«» This implies that to establish
that an art of acquisition is according to nature is to establish
that one who is practicing this art. is justly acquiring property;
and to establish that such an art. is contrary to nature is to
establish that, one who is practicising this art is acquiring
property unjustly.
Aristotle first argues that, one form of the art of
acquisition is according to nature in a somewhat disjointed and
difficult argument. (1,8).
I offer the following reconstruction.
gart I (1256al9-b7.
)
1. There are many kinds of food.
2. It is impossible to live without food.
3. Animals have many different modes of life according to
what is advantageous for -food.
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•4.

[Nature provides animals with whatever is advantageous.3
<Tacit premiss; compare Physics II, 8 )
5» Therefore, nature has differentiated the modes of life of
an imaIs in re 1ation to their fac iIit ies and pref er enees
for food.
6 . Similarly, men have many different modes of life which
involve industry that is self-grown Cautophut on> and not
by exchange or retai 1 trade — viz. the shepherd,
husbandman, brigand, fisherman, and hunter.
7. [Therefore, nature has differentiated the modes of life
humans in relation to their facilities and preferences
for food.] (Tacit inference from 5 and 6 )
Part.I,|.(1256b7-30>,
8.

Nature makes nothing incomplete and does nothing in vain.
a. [What, is needed to make X complete exists for the
sake of X.3
b. [What exists for the sake of X is given to X by
nature.3
9» The yolks, milk., etc. needed by the young at birth are
given to them by nature.
10. Similarly, [since animals need plants for food,! plants
exist for the sake of animals.
11» Humans need animals for the food, clothing, and
instruments and as beasts of burden.
12. Similarly, animals exist for the sake of man.
Conclusions (1256b7-10. 26-3Q
13. Therefore, such property Uctesis) [i.e. needed for
subsistence! is given by nature to all both a birth and
when grown. <cp. 10, 1258a34—37)
14. Therefore, one kind of acquisitive art belongs by nature
to household management, which must, be present (or
household management must provide that it be present),
and this acquisitive art has to do with those storeable
things which are necessary and useful for the community
of the polis or household, (cf. Newman 1887, II, p. 179)
I treat (13) as following from both parts because of'the oun at
1256b7), which indicates that it follows in some way from Part I,
and because of the gar at blO, which implies that Part II is
intended to support (13). The oun at b26 implies that (14)
follows at least from Part II.
I shall not attempt, to recapitulate in detail the objections
which have been leveled against Aristotle's argument by Newman,
Susemihl and Hicks, and more recent critics. They have argued
for example that the first part identifies the natural with
"primitive," which cannot support the conclusion Aristotle wants.
I do want to call attention to premiss (8 ) which occurs also in
the arguments for the organic theory of the polis in Pol iti cs I,
2. I haves unpacked two teleological principles, (13a) and (8 b),
which will, I think, make the argument go through.
Unfortunately, (8 a) and (8 b) would support the conclusion that
human beings exist for the sake of and are given by nature to
lions and other carnivorous beasts. Hence Aristotle is probably
assuming another principle such as that at VII, 14, 1333a21-24¡¡
"The inferior always exists for the sake of the superior, and
this, is manifest in matters of art as well as of nature. And the
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superior is that which possesses reason." This principle would
postulate a hierarchy of natural kinds along the following liness
If natural kind Ki has end Ei and natural kind Ka has
end E» and Ei is superior to Ea, then entities of kind
Ka exist for the sake of, and are given by nature to,
entities of kind Ki.
These teleological principles regarding the gift of nature have a
place in Aristotle's theory of natural ac.qui si ti on comparable to
the basic principles in Locke's theory! from the view of
revelation that "Bod has given the earth to the children of men";
or from the view of assumption of "natural reason" that "men
being once born have a right to their preservation, and
consequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature
•affords for their subsistence." (Second Treat ise 5, 26).
However, Aristotle wants to establish that the acquisitive
art. is natural without establishing too much! he wants to
establish that it is a natural art on1y in so far as it provides
the necessary means for the natural ends of the household art and
statesmanship.
Part II.I (1256b50-59)
15. No instrument (organon) belonging to any art is without a
limit whether in number or in size.
16. True wealth is a collection of instruments for the
householder and statesman. (Compare Politics I, 4)
17. Therefore, a limit (teraa) of wealth has been fixed.
18. Therefore, the amount of property sufficient for good
life is not unlimited (apeiros) .
19. [The good life is the end of the polis.I (Tacit
premiss;! compare Pol it ics I, 2)
20. Therefore, true wealth consists of such things Cas in
143.
21. [An acquisitive art which provides true wealth is
according to nature.3
22. Therefore, an acquisitive-; art belongs according to nature;
to householders and statesmen.
Natural acquisition has a limit resulting from its
subordination to the household art statesmanship, for which it
produces the instruments. The basis for (15) is suggested later
at 9, 1257b27—28: the end of an art may be unlimited but. not the
means, for the the end is always the limit (peras) » But the idea
of a "limit" as used in (19) is unclear because a limit may be
understood as a baseline (minimum) or a ceiling (maximum). Does
the end require that a certain baseline of resources be acquired
or a. certain ceiling? If the; end is "the good life" it would seem
more reasonable to interpret the limit as a baseline, but.
Aristotle interprets it as a ceiling.
His reason for this become somewhat clearer in I, 9, as we
shall see (cf. also VII, 4, 1326a35—40)» For in Poli1 1cs 1, 9
Aristotle contrasts this agreeable acquisitive art with another
acquisitive art which has no limit (1256b41—1257al> and is due to
exerience and art rather than due to nature (1257a4—55. This
other art is not according to nature (ou kata phusin) but is
against nature (para phusin)» It involves commerce or retail
exchange, which he seeks to distinguish from another type of
exchange which he finds unobjectionable. Thus the argument falls

Aristotle on Property Rights

into two parts; a defense of barter or simple exhange (allage)
and a critique of commerce (kapelike).
Defense of Barter (1257a6-50)
1. Each piece of property has two uses; Cone is to use it to
satisfy one's wants,! the other is to exchange it.
2. The proper use of P is that for the sake of which P has
come into existence.
33 A piece of property (e.g. a shoe) has two uses; .e.g. to
be worn and to be exchanged.
4. A piece of property did not come into existence for the
sake of barter.
5» Therefore, barter is not. its proper use.
6 . Activities carried out in order to replenish one's
natural self-sufficiency are the result of the natural
and are not contrary to nature.
7» Barter is carried out in order to replenish one's natural
self suff ici ency.
8 . Therefore, barter is not contrary to nature.
The Critique of Commerce <1257b20-1258al8)
1. Commerce is the art of producing wealth by exchanging
things with money.
2. The other arts, e.g. medicine, pursue their ends without
limit.
3. Similarly, this form of acquisition whose end is wealth
and the possession of property pu.ru.ses its end without
1 iinit .

4.
5«
6.

For the natural acquisitve art all wealth has a limit.
Therefore, commerce is an unnatural acquisitive art.
The unlimited end of commerce is due to a false idea of
the good life, vis. as unlimited gratification of
desires, which requires unlimited wealth.
7. An art which pursues the unlimited gratification of
desires leads human beings to use their powers in a way
not according to nature [not according to the mean of
moral virtue"!.
8 » Therefore, commerce is an unnatural art.
The analogy between commerce and medicine in Aristotle's
critique is both illuminating and disturbing.
It provides a
reason for saying that the end of commerce is unlimited, but it
also raises the questions why is commerce, but not medicine, an
unnatural art? It is not that commerce employs a perverted
instrument, viz. filthy lucre, because it uses the same
instrument, as the natural art <1257b35—38) » (Sinclair's
suggestion that Aristotle means to contrast commerce with
medicine runs afoul of the houto kai at b28 which he translates
as "but.") Aristotle's attempt to distinguish them relies upon
the claim (6 ) that commerce is the result of excessive desires
and, implicitly, of a a morally vicious disposition.
It is not
however entailed by the definition of commerce that it is the
result of excessive desires. For the definition leaves it open
that an individual could practice the art in an excessive manner
but it no more entails that this must happen than does the
definition of medicine. Aristotle simply dismisses without
argument the possibility that one could observe the mean while
engaging in commerce.
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Whatever difficulties it raises, Aristotle's prescription of
a limit for natural acquisition .is an interesting parallel to the
Lockean proviso for just acquisition, namely that there must be
"enough, and as good left in common for others»" (5, 27). To be
sure, Aristotle's argument for a limit is based upon
self-regarding considerationss excessive acquisition will
prevent the agent from achieving the good life. Nevertheless, it
is noteworthy that when Aristotle sums up his conclusions in II,
10 he asserts that retail exchange is justly censured "for it is
not. according to nature but from one another" <1258bl—2) » This
very brief remark does not obviously follow from the critique and
would require extensive and speculative unpacking. But one way of
reconstructing his argument is that commercial acquisition is a
zero-sum game in which for every gainer there is·a loser, so that
if any person exceeds his limit, he can do so only by taking
something away from someone else»
In this sense one would be
making a unnatural, hence unjust gain "from one another»"
Moreover, since Aristotle evidently assumes that nature provides
a fixed ‘
supply of goods just, sufficient for individuals to
satisfy their natural ends (cf» 10 1258a34—37), he would regard
an individual who significantly exceeded the natural limit of
acquisition as depriving others of what they need.
6 . Private Property, Coalman Use

,

The arguments of Pol it ics I are concerned with the property
rights of a person qua householder or statesman» But the
discussion of private property in Pol iti cs II, 5 occurs within a
wider context in which it is evident that Aristotle is concerned
with the property of individuals <hekastoi)„ This is evident in
his criticism of Socrates' alleged hypothesis that the greater
the unity of the polis the better, which leads Socrates to
collapse the polis into an individual and to ignore that the
polis is a natural plurality C1261al5-21>« Aristotle points out
that Socrates' scheme involves treating property on the same
footing as wives and chi Iren, namely, in common. He criticizes
Socrates' claim that "everyone" should say that the same thing
"mine" (1261 b 16—32 ). Soc rat es fa 11 ac ious 1y moves bet.ween two
senses of "everyone"s Everyone can say of his own wife, child and
property that it is "mine," but. he does this as an individual
<hos hekastos) » This is not Socrates' meaning; he speaks of
"everyone, but not as individuals" (pantes
ouch hos hekastos
au ton b25—27).
Although II, 5 is concerned with whether property should be
common or not in the best state, it is obviously an
oversimplification to treat, his argument simply as a "vindication
of private property rights." For he only takes into account
three property schemes5 (i) private property, common use; (ii)
common property, private use; and (iii) common property,
common use. He omits from discussion another optioms
Civ)
private property, private use« He is not defending a system of
unqualified privatization» Hence, we should take careful note of
the proviso he adds when he expresses a preference for the
"present mode, if improved by custom and correct legal order"
(1263a22—23; cp. 1, 1261a8 where there is no proviso) ,A
Aristotle's way of defending his preferred option is not
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deductive but is deliberative (seeking the better of three
options) and dialectical (appealing to accepted opinions related
to property)» He appeals to five different criteria for
evaluating a property arrangements
1 . it does not give rise to quarrels and complaints (5,
1263a8-21, 27-28, b23-27)
2 . it leads to improvement due to greater care being taken
in the property Í1263a28-29; 3, 126lb33-40; VII, 15,
1299a38)
3« it is consistent with friendship (1263a29—40; cp» VII, 8,
1328a25-28; 10, 1329b41-1330a2);
4» it fosters natural pleasures, especially of self-love
(1263a40-b5>;
5» it.· makes possible the exercise of virtues such as
generosity or liberality (1263b5—14; 6, 1265a28-38)»
Aristotle's thesis; is that these criteria taken together show
that, mode (i ) private property, common use is better than the
other modes» The omitted option (iv) would no doubt be ruled out
by appeal to criterion 3 ícp» Dobbs:· 1985, pp» 39-40)» Plato's
scheme (iii) is ruled out by the other four criteria in
Aristotle's view» Unfortunately, Aristotle is rather unclear
throughout this discussion about how these modes differ in
practice and what exactly his distinction between "common
property" and "common use" comes to. This has to be gathered
from the criteria on which he bases his argument. For example,
both (ii) and (iii) allegedly fail criterion 1 because conflict
is unavoidable under these schemes;; but Aristotle does not.
explain how his own scheme (i) does any better» Why does not the
"common use" of slaves, horses, dogs, or crops lead to the same
sorts of conflicts as those for which he indicts (ii) arid (iii)?
A straightforward and plausible explanation of why Aristotle
does not think that this problem will arise for (i) is that he
takes it for granted the working concept of property rights
defined in Rhetoric I, 5. In the case of object P and two
individuals, X', who wants P put to use U , and V", who does not
want P put to this use, if neither has the right to decide in
this matter, conflict is the predictable reisu.lt« This is what,
happens in schemes (ii) and (iii) according to Aristotle» But in
his scheme (i) for any object P there is some individual X whom
it is up to to decide how P will bei used, so that conflict can bes
avoided. Thus although Aristotle recognizes that conflicts occur
in systems of private property, he still maintains that conflict
is far more characteristic of common property arrangements.
I think that, criterion 2 should be taken along similar lines.
Some modern commentators find a parallel between Aristotle's
argument and the economic argument that property is used more
efficiently when producers have the incentives associated with
private ownership»··1
' But criterion 2 has not so much to do
with economic incentives as with the assignment, of authority« For
what Aristotle says iss "What is common to the greatest number
receives the least care; for one cares most for private things
and less for common things or only in so far as he has a share in
it; for in addition to the other reasons he thinks little about
it on the grounds that someone else is giving heed to it, just as
in the household affairs many servants sometimes provide worse
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service than a few." If, as I suppose, Aristotle is tacitly
assuming the property rights concept of Rhetoric I, 5, his point
is that an individual X will take greater care of object P to th©
.extent that the use of P is up to
if its use is up to many
individuals in addition to
X will take less care of P on the
grounds that other people? are taking care of it. This also fits
the household example, in which a master assigns particular
spheres of authority to his servants.
This interpretation is also consistent with criterion 3 and
can be used to explain how he? can reconcile a defense of private
property with the common use characteristic of friendship.
Although private property implies that particular individuals
have rights over particular objects, Aristotle also claims that,
they should place these objects at. the disposal of their friends»
As long as some individual has the final say over what friend
uses what, property criterion 3 is consistent with criterion 1. l'fcis the function of the educational system to habituate
individuals to share their property as well as to observe limits
on acquisition of the sort discussed in section 5 (5, 1263a38—40*
7, 1267b5—9) , Therefore, this criterion rules out a scheme of
private property, private use, but it is consistent with a schem©
like (i) in which educated adults retain property rights.
Criteria 4 and 5 can also be better appreciated from the
standpoint of the property rights interpretation. Criterion 4
introduces a new line of teleological arguments a property
scheme is according to nature to the extent that it fostèrs
natural pleasures of self-love. The case of true self-love is th©
man who acts according to his own rational judgments
"the thing©
men have done on a rational principle are thought most properly
thëir own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the man himself»
then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that
the good man loves most this part, of him." i1
True
self-love requires than men be able to act according to their own
judgment, and the existence of private property provides them the
sphere in which they can do so,, "
Criterion 5 concerns moral virtues such as .generosity or
Iiberal ity, the. funct ion of. which is in the use? of possessions
(en gar te chresei ton ktenaton to tes eleutheriotetos ergon
estin, 1263bl3-14). Again, I take Aristotle to be intending an
argument of the following sorts A property scheme should permit
the exercise of generosity, which involves the use and alienation
of property <cp. ^.i..c.om.ac.hean Ethics IV, 1, 1119b23-26>„ Since
one? can act generously generous only if one acts voluntarily and
by choice, one can act generously only if the use? and alienation
of property is up to oneself. And this is the case only in a
system of private ownership.
7.

Citizenship and Property

In Politics VII, 9 Aristotle argues that property should
belong to the citizens of the polis. This argument is part of a
discussion of "the best polis" (1328b34). After discussing
"material" questions about the extent and nature of the territory
and about the number and quality of the citizens (chapters 4-7),
he turns to the "formal" or structural questions about the
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organization of .the .polis, '(chapters· 8~12). The distribution of
property is one■of these -formal .questions.
This discussion begins with an argument in chapter 8 that in
the case of the polis, as in that, of other natural wholes, a
distinction must be made between its parts and conditions which
are necessary for its existence. Aristotle argues that, a part of
the polis must, satisfy two requirements!
it must perform a
necessary function of the polis (1328b3-5>, and it must be
capable; of participating in the common end of the polis (of,,
a33—37) .. In the best polis this end is the best life -.possible,
eudaiaonia, which is the perfect realization and employment of
virtue;, and in deviant states it will be something less than
this. But in any case; the parts of the polis can include only
.those; who are; capable of participating .in the end of the polis»
Hence, property .- including slaves, even though they are living
creatures . is a necessary means but not part of the
■polis(a33—35)« Among the other classes (gene) which satisfy the
first indispensability requirement are farmers, soldiers, the
wealthy, priests, and judges (b5—23).
In chapter 9 Aristotle argues that only some of these classes
can satisfy the participation requirement. The argument, proceeds
as follows' (1328b33-1329a2>s
1» The best, constitution is that under which the polis will
be most happy.
2. Happiness requires moral virtue (c.p„ 1, 1323b29—36; 8 ,
1328a37-38)»
3» The best, polis is best governed and possesses men who are;
just without qualification and not. just relative to a
hypothesis <cp. IV, 7, 1293b3>.
4» CThose who are just without qualification fulfil the end
of the best, constitution.!
5. Therefore, the best polis possesses men with moral
virtue.
6 . Leisure is necessary for moral virtue and political
activities.
7. Farmers do not have leisure.
8 » The life of mechanics and tradesmen is ignoble and
inimical to virtue (cp. Ill, 5, 1278a20-21; VIII, 2 ,
13337bll—15)»
10. Therefore, the citizens must be men of leisure but not
mechanics or husbandmen in the best state (cp. Ill, 5,
1278a17-20)
Aristotle next contends that the military and
deliberative-juridical groups are especially parts of the best
polis. Rather than treating them as two distinct classes or gene
as Plato does, Aristotle argues that the tasks of soldier and
delibérator— jurist should be carried out by the same people at
different agess
It remains therefore to a assign these constitutional rights
(ten politeian tauten) to both, the same classes, not,
however, at the same time but just as strength belongs to
younger men by nature (pephuken) and practical wisdom to
older men, it is expedient and just for them to be
distributed; for this division is accordinq to merit
E 1329al3—171!.·
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According to this argument the constitution should assign and
distribute political rights or powers according to natural
justice. The argument, which immediately follows (al7—26) traces
the implications of this tor property: "Moreover (alia men),
properties should also be centered around these persons ..." I
reconstruct this argument as follows:
1. [The hyothesis of the best polis is that happiness is the
end. 3 (Tacit.premiss)'
2. A polis should not be called happy by viewing a part of
it but by viewing all of the citizens (cp, 2,
1324a23—25)»
3. Happiness must exist with moral virtue.
4. [Therefore, all and only those capable of moral virtue
share in the polis,, i.e., are citizens of the best
polis.3
4. The military and deliberative-juridical members aré
capable of moral virtue (see argument above).
5» Therefore, soldiers and deliberator-jurists are citizens
of the best polis.
6 . Citizens of the best polis must have prosperity
(eupor ian).
7. [Prosperity requires property.3
8 « Therefore, property must be in the hands of (peri) the
citizens of the best polis <cp. Susemi hi and Hicks 1894,
p. 510).
9. Mechanics and other vulgar classes are not "demiurges of
virtue." (cp, III, 9, 1280a33)
10. Therefore, mechanics and other vulgar classes are not
citizens of the best polis.
11. The'farmers are slaves or barbarian serfs.
12» Therefore, property will belong [exclusively?] to the
military and deliberative-juridical members.
There are obvious difficulties with the argument, even if one
accepts the premisses on which Aristotle bases it, for example,
that farmers, mechanics, merchants, and generally all individuals
in the polis who work for a living and do not belong to the
leisure class are incapable of moral virtue. For if, as seems to
be the case, Aristotle wants the conclusion to be that property
belongs exclusively to the soldiers and councillors, this does
not follow from his premisses.
(12 ) so understood would follow
only if (8 ) also included "exclusively," but. that would not.
follow from (6 ) and (7). Hence, his premisses in fact leave open
the possibility that free noncitizens might possess property as
well. The issue is further complicated by the fact, that the
summary in chapter 10 describes the previous argument as dealing
with land (ten choran, 1329b36—38), prompting the question
question of whether the earlier argument was intended to be
restricted to land rather than to the movable property, including
tools of the trade, which might 'belong to artisans and laborers
(cp. Newman 1887, I, p. 198 n. 3). However, the summary may not
be Aristotle's (cf. Susemihl and Hicks 1894, p, 516).
Of greater interest here are Aristotle's first two premisses.
(1 ) which states the hypothesis of the best polis is essentially
the same consequentialist, eudaimonist principle which we have
seen at work in Rhetor!c I, 5 and Politics I. But (2) introduces
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a clearly distributive element as wells the end is not merely
happiness, but happiness realized by al 1 of the citizens., The
principle is foreshadowed at 2, 1324a23-25;
"It is evident that
the constitution is that order under which.anyone. <hostisoun) may
act best and live blessedly." <Cp„ also II, 5, 1264b17-19, which
this significantly strengthens),, Aristotle applies this
distributive principle in VII, 10, when he argues in favor of a
proposal (adopted from Plato's Laws V 7450 that, eaxch person's
property should be divided into two lots, one near and the
frontier and one near the city. "in order that two lots may be
distributed to each person and everyone may have a share of both
districts. For in this way there is equality (to ison> and
justice (to dikaion) and greater unanimity regarding border wars"
.(1330al4—IS) » Thus, Aristotle argues that property should be
distributed not only on the basis of considerations of expediency
or security but also on the basis of considerations of
distributive justice»
<Cp„ VI, 3, 1318bl—5 where to ison kai to
dikaion is applied to political rights, viz. voting.)■Hence, this
argument adds to the preceding arguments the idea in the best
polis each citizen has a right to a share of property based on a
principle of distributive justice.
The argument of VII, 9-10 also differs from the preceding
arguments in the importance which it places upon citizenship as a
basis for property rights. The relationship between political
rights and property rights in Aristotle may be compared to Joseph
Raz's distinction between core rights and derivative rights
(1984, p. 198). A core right, is justified directly on the basis
of some some aspect of a person's well being or interests,
whereas the justification of a derivative right includes the
assertion of some other right.
In VII, 9-10 Aristotle is arguing
that individuals in the polis who have the capacity for happiness
and moral virtue have a core right to citizenship and a share in
the government. Political rights are core rights because the
exercise of these rights is constitutive of happiness and the
good life. But since citizenship can be exercised only by those
who have sufficient property to afford them with leisure,
citizens also have a derivative right to property. When
Aristotle summarily concludes in VII, 9 that property should
belong exclusively to citizens he may simply be taking it for
granted that if property rights cannot be justified as derivative
from political rights they cannot be justified at all. This
priority of political over property rights in Aristotle is
fundamentally at. variance with thepriority of property to
government in Locke (cp. Mathie 1979, p. 17) and is rooted in the
basic principles of the Poli ti cs, most importantly, the
principles of I, 2 that man is a political animal and the polis
is prior to the individual·
8. Summary and Applications
In the introduction I stated a number of questions which a
theory of rights might, be expected to answer. On my
interpretation, I take Aristotle's theory to be offering the
following answers;
(1 ) Who has rights to property? He offers two different
answers in the Pol_i.tics; it is the citizen of the best polis in
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Politics. VÎI and the householder in Book. I. As a matter of
justice every citizen of· the best polis should be a land-holding
householder (VII, 9-10),
In the polity, which he regards as the
best of the deviant poleis, the citizens have moderate and
sufficient property (IV, 11, 1295b39—40)« Moreover, in democracy
he suggests that "the proceeds of the public revenues should be
collected and distributed among its poor, especially, if
possible, in such quantities as may enable them to acquire a
small estate, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or
farming
(VI, 5, 1320a35-bl), The focus in these discussions
is on land.
It is evidently taken for granted, but not stated,
that artisans and and other lower classes possess movable
property (cp, Newman 1887, I, p. 198 n. 3).
(2> To·what objects do they have property rights? The answer
gi ven in Rhetor ic I, 5 is .land (including dwellings), movable
objects, animals, and slaves. Although this answer is accepted in
the Pol itics. Aristotle assumes important distinctions between
land and other forms of property,
(3) What, form does the exercise of property rights take?
According to Rhetoric I, 5 this consists of two elements!! X
possesses P in such a way that the use of P is up to X and the
alienation of P (giving it away or selling it) is up to X. I
have argued that this concept is presupposed throughout
Aristotle's treatments of private property in the Pol it.ics.
(4) What, is the general moral justification for the thesis
that individuals have property rights? I have surveyed four
principal stretches of argument. These rely upon a number of
Ar istote 1ian pr inc ip les, for ex.amp 1e , t.hat happ iness and its
parts should be protected and promoted, that nature provides all
living things with what, is necessary for living and attaining
their ends, and that everyone should in justice and fairness have
the things necessary for the exercise of moral virtue and
citizenship in the polis»
I have suggested that there are two at.
least two sorts of tensions among the different lines of argument
which Aristotle offers for private property ownerships First,
some of his arguments treat property rights as core rights
because? the use of property is itself a part of the human end -of
eudaimon ia , whereas other other arguments treat the possesssi on of
property as a derivative right because it is a necessary
condition for certain core rights (viz, political rights) but
having and using property are not treated as constitutive?
elements of the? good life. Second, sometimes his arguments
appear to be-purely consequentialist, justifying property
ownership as necessary for the ends of the human being or the
polis, but sometimes the arguments also introduce considerations
of justice and fairness, emphasizing that al 1 relevant, persons
have rights to property,
(5) Under what circumstances do individuals justly acquire
title to specific objects and under what circumstances do they
come to possess them unjustly? Aristotle recognizes a number of
different ways in which property can be justly acquired!: original
acquisition from nature (hunting, farming, etc.), barter, cash
exchange, gifts, inheritance, and distribution by the government.
(Aristotle is often faulted for not employing a labor theory of
acquisition (cf. e.g. Susemihl and Hicks 1894, p„ 28), but it has

Aristotle on Property Rights
Page 18

become clear in recent discussions by Nozick and others that, the
labor theory itself is not free.of difficulty.) Aristotle like
Locke attaches certain condi tions.to the just acquisition of
property; An individual X can justly acquire object P provided
that (i) the natural end of X' is superior to the natural end of P
(if P has one), (ii) in acquiring P , X does not exceed his
natural limit, and (iii) X' does not unjustly take P from some
other person. 1 see no evidence, however, that Aristotle is
committed to the view that X owns P only if X' uses P to perform a
virtuous act or puts P to common use (e.g. shares it with a
friend). To be sure, Aristotle argues that individuals should be
able to acquire property because they need it in order to perform
virtuous and friendly acts; and he directs the legislators to
.institute public education to habituate the citizens to this end.
But it does not follow from this that the just acquisition of
each piece of property is contingent on the performance of a
virtuous and friendly act.'5’
• (6 ) Under what circumstances, if any, are property rights
defeasible or quail fiable? This is a most complicated and
difficulted question to which I can only sketch'an answer here.
Newman remarks that Aristotle's defense of private property in
Politics. 11 , 5 is ηg t e>·:pres&1y coup 1ed w ith quaXif icatiοns
(1087 , I , pp « 199.200) , but Aristotle in fact endorses various
soc ial pol :i.c :i.es wh :i.ch trench upon pr ivate pr oepr ty r igh.ts s he
endqrsee pub 3.:i.e property , po sitive dut ies οn the part of pr ivate
property owners, Ximitations and equal ization of Xand hold!ngs„
rest r ict ions on al ienat ion , and even ostr ac ism agai nst the very
wealthy,, Nevertheless, I believe that Aristotle's theory can be
shown to be on the who 3.e coherent «
Aristotle argues that part of the land of the best polis must
be common in order to provide for common needs, including common
meals and service to the gods (Pol it ics VII, 10),, He also
recommends that public monies be used for the needy in deviant
peléis (III, 5, 1320b 1-25 cp. Constitution of Athens 49)
But
it should be.remarked that Aristotle's .arguments for private
property rights do not commit him to the total privatization of
the polis's resources. His position might be compared to modern
political philosophers who favor private property rights on
general principle, but also recognize the need for nonprivate
solutions to problems of "public, goods" and for the provision of
a social safety net for those who cannot help themselves.
Moreover, private property owners have positive duties to the
polis, especially of providing revenues both for internal needs
and for the purposes of wair (VII, 8 , 1328bl0-ll; III, 12,
1283al8). But this is consistent with his position that property
rights are derivative from and subordinate to political
r ight s and resp on si tai1it ies. Ar isto11e also presc r ibes that
those who can afford it should provide support so that no citizen
should lack the means of subsistence;, both in the best polis
(VII, 10, 1329b41—1330a2) and in deviant constitutions (VI, 6 ,
1320b2 ff .). But. he perceives these as virtuous acts and as
ap p 1 icat ion s of his'principle of "pr ivat e own ership, common use„"
Aristotle repeatedly advocates limits upon the? amount of land
which any individual can accumulate. This is implied in his
statement in VII, 10 each citizen of the best state should have
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two lots of land (cp. also II, 7, 1267bl2—13)» He also approves
of laws in democracies which prohibit individuals from acquiring
more than a certain measure <metron) (VI, 4, 1319a8—10)» He also
favors the inalienability of lands ie. he wants to restrict the
right to sell and bequeath land (exousia didonai kai kataleipein,
II, 9, 1270al8—21). However, one of his arguments for this is
suggestives in oligarchies gifts and inheritances should toe
restricted so that properties are more on a level and mare of the
poor could establish themselves as prosperous (V, 8, 1309a23—26) .
Because Aristotle excessive acquisition of property by any
citizen as contrary to nature and thus unjust and as depriving
other citizens of the means to the good life, he would regard
these restrictions upon acquisition and alienation as just as
well as expedient. .
.
Ostracism provides a more extreme and difficult case..
Aristotle seems to acknowledge that there may be some political
justice idikaion polit ikon) if the citizens of a deviant polis or
even of the best polis decide to ostracize one of the number who
is extraordinarily wealthy (III, 13, 1284bl5-34; VI, 8, 1308b19)«
But Aristotle defends the practice as just as well as expedient,
and he could justify ostracism on the grounds that the extremely
wealthy man has egregiously exceeded the natural bounds of
acquisition and that he has thereby accumulated so much power
than he is jeopardizing the constitution and the political rights
of his fellow citizens.
In sum, these restrictions which Aristotle places upon
property rights may be justified on the basis of features of the
general theory mentioned above; the provisos on the acquisition
of property, the subordination of property rights to political
rights and duties, and the "private property, common use"
doctrine.
It should, finally, not be overlooked that property rights
place certain constraints upon the conduct of governments
according to Aristotle. Specifcally he criticises confiscation
by democratic majorities of the property of wealthier citizens
(VI, 3, 1318a25-26¡¡ cp» III, 10, 1281a21) .
He explicitly
rejects the conventionalist argument that whatever law the
majority decides to enact is just, objecting that even if the
majority wants it, such confiscation is un 1ust (adikesousi
deaeuontes ta ton plousion kai elattonon) „ That is the? property
owner has a claim of justice, a right, against other citizens
which is violated by the law of confiscation.
I conclude that Aristotle addresses the questions that must
be answered by a theory of property rights. His way of
developing, justifying, and qualifying his views on wealth and
property can be understood in terms of a property rights model.
And the policies he recommends for both the? best polis and for
deviant constitutions are illuminated by this model. Although I
have concentrated in this draft upon exegesis rather than
criticism, I think that the property rights interpretation also
brings to light difficulties and tensions within Aristotle's
thought on property.
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Notes

Λ0 η the location of e *e see Grimaldi 1980 ad 1oc.
“Although I find persuasive John's Cooper's arguments that
"flourishing" is generally the preferable translation of
eudai»onian I conform to the customary "happiness" in order to
avoid unnecessary confusion.
■»For <A> compare Politics VII, 1, 1323b21-23; 3, 1325a32,
bl2— 16ϋ also Plato Charmides 172a. For <B> compare Nicomachean
Ethics'I. 5, 1097b7—21 ;
7, 1177a27-b4; F(hetoric I, 5, 1360b23.
For (C) compare Rhetoric I, 5, 1360b28.
^Aristotle's enumeration of these parts is complicated,
seemingly redundant, and possibly inconsistent. On the ways of
counting and classifying these parts see Grimaldi 1980, pp.
106-107.
»The importance of these principles for Aristotle's political
theory is made very clear in D» Keyt's unpublished "Three.
Fundamental Theorems in Aristotle's Politics." to which I am also
indebted for these references. As Keyt also remarks the sphere
of justice is not the natural as such, but is confined to conduct
involving at least two human beings (Nicomachean Ethics V, 1,
1129b25—27, 1130al0-13; 11, 1138aI9-20;X, 8 ~ ÎÏ78b8-T2 ).
A In omitting the fourth mode of property while representing
himself as defending the "present mode,” Aristotle may be
exhibiting what Francis Sparshott has referred to as his
"subversive traditionalism." Aristotle comes forward as a
defender of a traditional customs such as slavery, female
inferiority, and private property, but in the course of defending
radically redefines them,· so that, in effect, the traditional
institutions have been subverted and undermined (cp. also Barker
1906, p„ 394 n. 1)
"'Cp. the op-ed piece by Richard Critchfield in the Nov. 16,
1985 New Yor k T imes comparing the current economic reforms in the
People's Republic of China with Aristotle's arguments in Politics.
II, 5. The modern commentators are, of course, principally“ “
interested in the ownership of land and capital used to produce
goods for consumption, whereas Aristotle, as we have.seen, is
elsewhere concerned with practical property which can be directly
used in the activities which constitute the good life.
Nevertheless, the example which he uses to introduce the three
options at Politics II, 5, 1262b40—8 includes land as well as the
food grown on it, from which it. is evident that Aristotle intends
his argument to apply to productive as well as practical
property.
»Following Drei zehnter I retain amphoterois in 1329al3 with
the MSS. On this use of politeia of. Newman III, p. 379 who
notes a parallel at II, 5, 1264a38.
^Dobbs (1985, p„ 40, n. 9) interprets Aristotle as here
maintaining, "paradoxically, only if one shares his property with
another can it be said that he has truly acquired it. This is
the insight, that lies beneath Aristotle's otherwise puzzling use
of the verbal and substantive forms of 'possession.'
In otherwords it is in a liberal action that it first comes to light that
a possession iktema) can be one's own apart from the? active
possessing (ktesis) or hoarding of it. Thus only the liberal man
will feel genuine, natural pleasure in ownership." Aristotle
would agree with the conclusion, but not, I think, with the
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premisses which Dobbs attributes to him. For the uses of kteseis
and ktematon indicate that liberality or generosity is concerned
with both of them. Recall also the definitions at I, 4,
1253b3i-32 which imply that ktesis is a collection of ktemata,,
Aristotle's point is not that X can acquire Y only if X shares it
with Z but that X ought to share Y with Z and that in order to do
so X must be able to acquire title to Y.
10 Cf. Jones 1956, p. 198, who also cites Constitution of
Athens 56.2 and Demosthenes 17.15 for the historical importance
of this issue. Aristotle also recommends that confiscation in
democracies be discouraged by limiting, the uses to which the
confiscated property can be put. (VI, 5, 1320a5-10) ·
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